

Reporting as of 1st April 2016

**Investment Philosophy and Style**

THE CIS SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES, offered by G&G Private Finance jointly with Maximus Capital S.A., invests in liquid equities, bonds and derivatives in Russia and other CIS markets. The CIS Special Opportunities objective is to capitalize on extreme mis-pricings due to events affecting companies, markets and Governments in its core markets of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The strategy invests solely in USD and EUR denominated securities traded on international exchanges and so faces no local currency or counterparty exposure.

**Monthly Commentary**

In March we returned 0.46%, on top of 5.15% in February. Most of our themes we discussed before (short Ferrexpo, long Mechel, long Mongolia) we entered very cautiously deploying on average 15% of capital. Given an unprecedented uncertainty in global markets (Brexit, US elections, oil rally, Russian exit from Syria, etc) creating an atmosphere where, even despite strong rationale behind each of our "special situations", the macro environment could have easily distracted investors from events which would have normally allow us to monetize our trades. Despite that, our Ferrexpo short trade returned 165%, however on a regrettably tiny position. The outstanding debt is \$868m (large chunk matures in July 2016) and cash at end of Feb 2016 is \$39m. Investment analyst just released their views - three new "sell" downgrades. Our Mechel long trade returned 20%, yet we continue to expect a massive rally as the de-facto agreement on debt restructuring becomes clear and the shareholders vote in favor (previous failure to achieve consensus was blamed on a technicality). Mongolian bonds we bought in the beginning of March returned on average 5.5% and now account for about 22% of total invested capital. We feel there is an additional 5-10% upside left and once we collect the coupons this May-July we will sell them. Overall, a well-timed trade in what we do best - capitalize on a disconnect between Western markets and local reality. As for the future "special situations" ideas we are working on a big one: collapse of the Russian banking system. We have started taking very cautious short positions in Sberbank and VTB. We can go on and on with our analysis of Russian banks - the deteriorating asset quality, weak capital structure, lack of funding, etc. but please allow me to summarize: they are all bankrupt, with their negative equity capital obscured by repo liquidity trades with the CBR. We expect two major events to occur within the next 3 months that would gravely threaten the stability of the banking system: introduction of the new F/X reserve requirements in May 2016 which would expose weak capital structures and require injection of new capital (hint: no one has any money to inject) and public acknowledgement by the CBR that funds will no longer be available to "rescue" and recapitalize private banks. Overall, we feel the global markets are very fragile and the emerging markets (CIS region especially) would feel the negative impact and would suffer disproportionately should a correction occur.


**The Fund**

Type	Actively Managed Fund
Issuer and lead manager	Leonteq securities AG
Sponsor	G&G Private Finance
Authorized distributor	Maximus Capital SA
Inception date	21th April, 2015
Jurisdiction	Guernsey, UK
Isin	CH0266687547

**General Conditions of the Fund**

Reference currency	USD
Liquidity	Daily
Valorisation	Daily
Management fee	2%
Performance fee	20%
Min investment	\$ 1000
Issue size	6,000 certificates
Issue price	\$ 1,000

**Performances**



**Management Company**


Monaco-based G&G Private Finance manages over €500 million and offers its clients tailored and discretionary asset management services, including risk analysis, capital preservation, and portfolio management in collaboration with leading banks across Europe. Maximus Capital is based in Geneva and manages portfolios for its UHNW clients while specializing in Russia and CIS markets. Both firms are seed investors in this product.

**Monthly Performances**

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr*	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	YTD*
<b>2016</b>	3.75%	5.15%	<b>0.46%</b>										<b>9.59%</b>
<b>2015</b>	13.6%	30.1%	-2.7%	-1.3%	12.53%	5.73%	4.25%	4.8%	4.11%	1.56%	-0.83%	3.79	75.64%
<b>2014</b>	2.2%	1.8%	7.9%	0.6%	2.4%	2.8%	3.1%	15.4%	7.2%	-4.2%	-3.8%	27.6%	63%

\*Performance figures prior to April 2015 represents performance of the strategy across managed accounts

**Portfolio Allocation**



Maxdrawdown	8.59%
Sharpe Ratio	2.82
Mar Ratio	4.43

**Contacts**

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**Principals**


Mr. Gene Zolotarev, who is co-head lead of the investment team, prior to founding Maximus Capital spent over 20 years in senior executive management roles (as a board member, CEO and Chairman) of asset management and investment banking divisions at large U.S., Russian and Baltic banks.



Mr. Gabriele Tagi, the other co-head of the investment team, is a director at G&G Private Finance who has been in the industry since 1986. He is a deep value specialist stock-picker with serious experience in senior executive positions in KBL Monaco Private Bankers, Compagnie Monegasque de Gestion, CMB Suisse Banque Privée, ABN AMRO Asset Management, Banca Commerciale Italiana.

**Recent Trades**

Security	Sale Price	Profit on Trade	Discussion of Trade
Ferrexpo	\$0.52	70%	In mid-October 2015 we took a short position in Ferrexpo, a metals trading company listed on the LSE entering it at the MFS price of 0.308. We felt confident that this company would experience severe pressure on its stock price due to the failure of the Finance & Credit bank, owned by the same principal shareholder as Ferrexpo, who we suspected was using the company's funds to prop up his own bank prior to its being taken under Ukrainian regulator's control and assets frozen. We exited the short position in mid January at 0.523 booking a 70% net profit on this trade.
MTS, VIP	\$1.91	61%	Starting July 2015 we started to accumulate short positions in MTS, Vimpelcom and Sistema (holding company for MTS) with an expectation that these companies might be negatively affected by either US/EU sanctions, Ukraine nationalization attempts or internal Russian oligarch infighting. Entry point for the short position on VIP was 5.3 and 8.2 for MTS. Both stocks trade on NYSE. We accumulated the short positions in VIP and MTS with a final average purchase price of \$4.9 and \$7.8 respectively, with 2x leverage. We exited the VIP trade at around \$1.91, booking a profit of 61%. MTS shares have also fallen but we continue to hold this position waiting for the right moment to lock in our profit.
Ukraine Sovereign Bonds	In mid 70's	34%	Following the restructuring of Ukreximbank, the Ministry of Finance embarked on a restructuring of sovereign eurobonds. In the background of an economy weakened by war, while remaining relevant from a geo-political perspective, Ukraine saw an opportunity to restructure its national debt. Following a declaration of "imminent default", bonds dropped to high 40s. We started buying Ukraine bonds, mostly short duration, in June and July at an average price of \$54, and continued to accumulate while both sides threatened to walk away from the deal. Post restructuring, the bonds rallied to low 80s, but we exited the trade fully in mid 70s, averaging a 34% gain per position.
Ukreximbank bonds	\$71	31%	Ukreximbank bonds have plummeted in price in recent months amid tensions with Russia, a falling currency and a weak Ukrainian economy. Earlier this year, after a declaration of "imminent default" and "likely 50% haircut," an 8.375% bond maturing in April fell to the low 50s. Thanks to information gleaned from our industry contacts, we felt the market was far overestimating the possibility of a default or a 50% haircut, and started buying the bonds in early April at an average price of \$54. On April 27th, bondholders accepted a restructuring offer that pushed the price to the mid 70s. We exited at 71, booking a 31% profit.
Alliance oil bonds	\$83.71	52.2%	Earlier this year, Alliance Oil announced it could not repay a bond that was to mature in March, and the company threatened to default. The price fell from the mid 90s to the low 50s. Our sources told us Alliance management was exaggerating the negatives and had enough cash to make the payment, so we started buying the bonds at about \$55. Just before maturity, Alliance announced a restructuring that paid 20% in cash and extended the bonds by four years at a price of \$70. We exited the trade at \$83, booking a profit of over 50%.